from Israel Studies Volume 2, Number 1

Toward a "Sound and Lasting Basis": Relations between the Holy See, The Zionist Movement, and Israel, 1896-1996

F. Michael Perko, S.J.

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INTRODUCTION

IN THE ANNALS OF MODERN diplomatic history, arguably no two non-belligerent states have had relations more tortuous and labyrinthine in complexity than Israel and the Vatican. Beginning even before the actual foundation of the State of Israel, and continuing through the Fundamental Agreement of 1993, relations between the two have fluctuated as a result of both geopolitical and theological shifts.

This relationship has been the topic of multiple historical studies. 1 For the most part, however, these fail to grasp the complexity, seeing it either as driven overwhelmingly by prevailing Catholic theological attitudes toward Jews and Judaism or by the Vatican's attempt to maintain political neutrality in intra-regional conflicts. 2 While both of these factors have been influential, neither has been the sole motivating force. Rather, Vatican policy toward Israel, and indeed earlier, toward Zionism itself, has been the result of a complex matrix of forces arising from the unique characteristics of both the Holy See and the Jewish State.

The complexity of the Vatican's role in its relations with Israel arises from its essentially dual character. On the one hand, it is a sovereign power, with particular policy goals. In recent history, as Kreutz points out, these have included a desire to "do good" by alleviating suffering, advocating causes of national and social justice, and setting an example for moral leadership in the political arena. 3

On the other hand, the Holy See exercises a pastoral and teaching role for the world's Catholics, and is a major vehicle by which the Church (as distinct from the Holy See) projects itself into the public sphere. Thus, its policy is oriented toward the needs of the Catholic community, as well as advocacy for its theological positions. Diplomatic overtures in Eastern Europe during the Soviet era, for example, were frequently influenced by the desire to protect Church rights and members, while opposition to abortion and contraception almost completely drove its activities at the 1994 Cairo Population Conference. 4

While these functions are related, they are not always perfectly congruent. Each, however, can and does impact on the other. 5 For example, one of the Church's major goals has been its desire to sustain Catholic communities throughout the region. This has found expression over the last century in concern expressed for the plight of Palestinian Christians, apprehension about the war in Lebanon, and fear of what impact shifts in Church responses to Judaism and Israel might have on the situation of Catholics in Arab-bloc countries.

Additionally, there is little doubt that the Church's attitude toward Jews and Judaism at any given moment has affected its diplomatic policy. Here, both theological shifts and recent reflection on the historical implications of the Shoah [Holocaust] have exercised major influences. 6 The axial event signaling a changed theological consciousness was thepromulgation of the Second Vatican Council's Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra Aetate, in 1965, followed in recent years by several documents concerned with its implementation and the treatment of Jews and Judaism by teachers and preachers.7

Personalities, too, have exerted strong influences. Pius XII, a career diplomat, developed a Middle East policy based heavily on fear of Communist expansionism. The fact that John Paul II is the first pope in modern history to have had substantive acquaintance with Judaism prior to his ecclesiastical career has also had its policy implications.

If all these influences have impacted upon the Holy See's diplomacy, Israel's unique ethno-religious character has inevitably influenced the Vatican's policy toward it in a way that would not be the case with, for example, Canada or Australia. Judaism's dual character as both people and religious system has added levels of complexity evident from Pope Pius X's reaction to Herzl's secularist vision to more contemporary tensions. Differences, too, between the way Israel has tended to regard the Vatican and the way in which the Holy See views itself have played their part in multiplying the complexity of the relationship. 8 It is in the light of such considerations that the history of Vatican-Israeli relations must be examined.

MID-NINETEENTH CENTURY TO THE PALESTINIAN MANDATE

The story of relations between the Holy See and what would eventually become the State of Israel begins with the increased interest of western powers in the Middle East's nineteenth century. In 1841, in an effort to check the expansionist tendencies of imperial Russia, Great Britain and Prussia established a Protestant bishopric in Jerusalem. Earlier, in 1837,

Pope Gregory XVI had extended the authority of the Melkite (Arabic Eastern Catholic) patriarch of Antioch to Alexandria and Jerusalem, establishing a Catholic ecclesiastical structure in Palestine. This was followed ten years later by the reinstatement of the Latin rite Patriarchate of Jerusalem, a Crusader-era bishopric that had fallen into disuse. The resurgence of interest was accompanied by rapid growth in Latin (western) Catholic Church institutions and membership. The approximately four thousand Latin-rite and mostly Arab Catholics in Palestine at the time of the reinstitution of the Latin Patriarchate had risen to nearly 20,000 by 1914. These were disproportionally urban and middle class, with nationalistic inclinations, factors that would set them on a collision course with Zionists. 9

From the movement's earliest years, however, the founders of modern Zionism sought support from Catholic religious leaders and the Holy See. Thus, on 19 May 1896, Herzl met with Agliardi, the papal nuncio in Vienna, and, in the hope of eliciting a positive Vatican response, promised that Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nazareth would be excluded from the Jewish State.10

This was followed eight years later by meetings with Rafael Merry del Val, the Holy See's Secretary of State, and with Pope Pius X himself. Here, according to Herzl's account, the impact of the Church's theological stance was obvious. In the 23 January 1896 meeting with Merry del Val, the Secretary of State opined that, since Jews denied the divinity of Christ, "How then can we, without abandoning our own highest principles, agree to their being given possession of the Holy Land again?" 11 At the meeting with Pius X three days later, the pope stated flatly, "The Jews have not recognized Our Lord, therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people."12

Themes that would become familiar were already evident. Both concern for the Holy Places, despite assurances that these would be extraterritorialized, and the traditional theological understanding of the Jews as unbelievers, doomed to perpetual exile because of their rejection of Jesus, seem to have undergirded the Vatican responses. 13

While meetings between another Zionist leader, Nahum Sokolow, with both Vatican Secretary of State Gasparri and Pope Benedict XV in 1917, seemed, according to Sokolow's account, to have generated positive responses to Zionist aspirations, it is unclear in retrospect whether these were a product of his boundless optimism or had a real basis in fact. 14

BRITISH MANDATE TO ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE

In most respects, Vatican policy during the Mandatory era was consistent with previous directions. Initially pleased by the ending of Ottoman control over the Holy Places, the Holy See gradually became wary of growing Jewish and Protestant power. Benedict XV made Vatican policy clear in his 13 June 1921 allocution to the College of Cardinals, insisting that, while the Church had no objection to Jewish settlement in Palestine, it opposed both Protestant proselytizing activity among Arab Catholics and Zionist hegemony. 15 In two meetings with Chaim Weizmann in the following year, Gasparri re-emphasized the latter point. 16

The situation in Palestine itself became more tense with each passing year. An increaseof 108 percent in the Jewish population from 1922 to 1931 (compared to a 29 percent growth in Arab population during that period) alarmed local Arabs. One result was the riots of 1929, in which over sixty Jews were killed in Hebron and other places. Combined with a nearly 75 percent growth in the overwhelmingly Arab Latin Catholic population, these demographics made greater diplomatic interest by the Vatican virtually inevitable.17

An additional factor influencing the Holy See's stance was concern over Communism. That many Zionists espoused a socialist ideology troubled those of more conservative persuasion. As early as 1919, a bizarre coalition of Protestant missionaries, Agudat Israel members, and the U.S. consul in Jerusalem had opposed Zionist aspirations on the grounds that they would bring Bolshevism to Palestine. 18 By the 1930s, more generalized concern over growing Soviet influence in the region would make this factor even more pronounced, especially given Pope Pius XII's particular sensitivity to communist and socialist ideologies.

The situation was further complicated by the coming to power of Hitler and the National Socialists in 1933. Both legal and clandestine immigration to Palestine greatly increased, spurring a rise in land prices at the very time that world wide recession struck the region, and contributing to the misery of Jews and Arabs alike.19

All of these factors contributed to growing social and political instability. It was unsurprising when, in 1937, the Peel Commission in 1937 recommended partition. Here, the Vatican's response was somewhat muted, the product of what one scholar sees as its desire not to antagonize the

Mandatory Powers who stood as bulwarks against revolution and Nazism, as well as a growing realization that total European hegemony over the region was coming to an end. 20 Local Christians, however, were vociferous in their objections, already exhibiting signs of a growing nationalism that would encompass Christians and Muslims alike. 21

In a tactful note to the British government, however, the Vatican made its opposition to the termination of the mandate clear. Instead, it proposed that the British zone that the Peel Commission had recommended be established in Jerusalem and Bethlehem be extended to include Nazareth as well as Mt. Tabor and the whole of Lake Kinneret. Concern was expressed, not only for the preservation of the Holy Places under a single governmental entity, but also for the rights of the Christian minority, most of whose members were concentrated in the Jerusalem corridor and the Galilee. 22 The Holy See's cautious approach expressed its concern with two of its traditional issues, the safeguarding of religious sites and the preservation of Christian rights.

Palestinian unrest continued with what amounted to a general revolt from 1937 to 1939 against British rule and increased Zionist activity. Conscious of the potential danger of alienating the Arabs as a world war became almost inevitable, the British policy of complete even-handedness became obvious in the MacDonald White Paper of 1939, which espoused neither the notion of Jewish hegemony nor Arab rule. The Vatican response was again restrained, with L'Osservatore Romano noting with satisfaction that the end result would be a power-sharing arrangement between Jews and Arabs. 23

The Second World War's impact upon the Holy See's Middle East policy was largely circuitous. While Pius XII engaged actively in efforts to aid European Jewry,24 his concern did not translate into a more Zionist-oriented Palestine policy. A 22 June 1943 memorandum from Archbishop Amleto Cicognani, Apostolic Delegate to the United States, to Myron Taylor, Roosevelt's delegate to the Vatican, set out the Holy See's traditional policy. Because of the land's connection with the life and death of Jesus, Catholic attachment and rights would suffer if it were under Jewish rule. Moreover, a Jewish state would give rise to "grave new international problems," a probable allusion to rising Vatican concern about future relations with the Arab world. 25

One important shift that the war did bring about, however, was the increasing influence of the United States on Vatican diplomatic policy. The Cicognani memorandum is only one piece of what became a continual exchange of diplomatic messages on a variety of subjects. It appears that America had now replaced Britain in Vatican eyes as the guardian of traditional western values and ideals. Unlike Britain, however, the United States had never developed a clear Middle-Eastern policy. This, combined with a significant Jewish population, tilted its policy somewhat in Zionist directions. While the Holy See would still oppose American interests when the latter ran counter to its traditional policies, United States diplomatic strategy seemed now to be taken very seriously by the Vatican, and would exert its influence, albeit subtly.

ISRAELI INDEPENDENCE TO THE SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL

With the passage of United Nations Resolution 181 accepting the partition plan for Palestine on 29 November 1947, the Palestinian Question came to center stage. While the plan was supported by the United States, France, and the Soviet Union, the situation that ultimately resulted created a disaster from the Holy See's perspective. On 3 March 1948 the leaders of all the Christian communities in the Holy Land signed a statement denouncing partition. In his encyclical Auspicia Quaedam of 1 May 1948 that focused on world peace and was seen as a partial response to the Deir Yassin massacres of 9 April, Pius XII expressed his worries about the situation of "killings and ruin" that had already begun and expressed the hope that "the condition of Palestine may be finally settled according to equity." 26

The War of Independence affected the Catholic Church and, as a result, the Vatican, in very specific ways. By its end, the Holy Land was once again in non-Christian hands and Jerusalem had not only not come under international control, but was now divided. Church property had been destroyed and looted. On 30 May 1948, leaders of the Catholic community in Jerusalem sent the Vatican a letter protesting Israeli occupation of Church property during military operations, followed by several others in June and July reporting to the Secretariat of State on the theft and destruction of property by Israeli forces in the Galilee. 27

Most important, however, was the refugee problem-a growing major factor in Vatican-Israeli relations. By the end of 1949, 60 to 70 percent of Palestinian Christians were refugees, and their generally middle-class

status made protests to Church authorities all the more effective. 28 The Catholic Church had long expressed interest in Palestinian Christians, seeing them as a critical constituent element of Catholicism's role in the Holy Land. Moreover, since it could not distinguish politically between Muslims and Christians, its policy in effect became one of concern for the welfare of all Palestinian refugees. This would bring it into conflict with the Israeli government time and time again.

These and other issues were treated in Pius XII's encyclical of 24 October 1948, In Multiplicibus Curis, which focused exclusively on the Palestinian Question. Sorrow was expressed at refugee suffering, while reports of "the destruction and damage of sacred buildings and charitable places built round the Holy Places" had inspired papal fears about the sites themselves. The remedy, the pope argued, was to create a climate of peace and justice that would ensure security and the resources necessary to material and spiritual well-being. Jerusalem and its environs ought to be internationalized, and guarantees should be given for freedom of access to religious sites throughout the country. 29 Similar themes were put forward in the 15 April 1949 encyclical Redemptoris Nostri, with additional concern for the liberty of Catholic places of worship, educational centers, and charitable institutions, and for the maintenance of Catholic rights. 30 These letters articulated major concerns that would motivate the Holy See's diplomatic activities for the next forty-five years.

That all of this was critical to Vatican-Israeli relations is made explicit by the comment to the British Minister by the Secretariat of State's Monsignor Montini, later Pope Paul VI, that there "would be no Vatican recognition of Israel, otherwise than in exchange for satisfactory guarantees about the international regime for Jerusalem and the Holy Places, and generally about the maintenance of Catholic rights in Palestine." 31

More practical steps were taken as well. Between the summer of 1948 and February of 1950, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the American hierarchy's social arm, sent US$1.3 million for Palestinian refugee relief, with Catholics from the rest of the world contributing another US$5 million. In June 1948, these efforts were given institutional expression with the formation of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine. 32

The last ten years of Pius XII's long reign witnessed the consistent application of the policies of which he was the architect. The work of the Pontifical Mission was expanded, in both Israel and the Jordanian-controlled West Bank. While the Vatican continued to press its concerns with its Western allies, and made overtures to Jordan, it also initiated informal contact with Israeli government and was supportive of American efforts to relieve Arab-Israeli tension. The approach was again a conservative one that sought to aid Palestinians and check perceived Soviet expansionism in the Arab world without alienating Israel and the United States.

After the death of Pius XII in 1958, overt Vatican diplomatic activity in the region slowed. While the new pope, John XXIII, had been a career diplomat, the Holy Land was mentioned only twice in public pronouncements during his five-year pontificate, and then in a largely religious context, although his private secretary, Loris Capovilla, insists that "quiet initiatives" continued. 33

Of more importance was the new pope's attitude toward Jews and Judaism. As a diplomat in Ankara during World War II, he had helped Jews escape from occupied Europe, in some cases to Palestine. During a subsequent posting to Paris, he met with Jewish leaders and often expressed sympathy for those murdered during the Shoah. These contacts, along with his generally friendly and outgoing personality, helped to provide institutional legitimacy for the inter-faith activities that were already becoming part of Catholic life in North America and Western Europe.

Perhaps John XXIII's greatest contribution to Vatican-Israel diplomatic relations was an indirect one-his convening of the Second Vatican Council in 1962. Besides fostering a more benevolent general attitude toward the world, the Council dealt with the issue of Jewish-Catholic relations, signaling a change in theological consciousness that was to have significant political outcomes.

NOSTRA AETATE

Perhaps no document of Vatican II had a more convoluted history than did Nostra Aetate, the Declaration on Relations with non-Christians. The complex interplay of theology and politics involved in its drafting, amending, and final redaction mirrored the complexity of Jewish-Catholic and Israeli-Vatican relations.

Initially conceived in 1960 by John XXIII, it was focused exclusively on Jewish-Catholic relations. In May 1961, a first draft was presented to the Council's Central Commission, which bowed to pressures from conservatives and the Arab states and refused to accept it. To circumvent this roadblock, it was annexed to the broader Decree on Ecumenism. Shortly before the scheduled debate on the document in the Second Session (1963), however, the entire schema was withdrawn, probably a result of forces that included conservative pressure, opposition by Middle-Eastern bishops, and the new pope, Paul VI's, desire to avoid anything that would jeopardize his forthcoming pilgrimage to Jerusalem. 34

When the document came to the floor again in September 1964, it did so in a very different form. With a view toward making it more palatable to the Arab world, it had been broadened to include all non-Christian religions. More disturbingly, the section exonerating the Jewish people of "deicide" had been watered down, and conversion had become a more prominent theme. Now pressure came from Jewish organizations, especially in America, deeply unhappy with the text. The Council fathers reacted by insisting that the original sense be restored. The text approved in May 1965, however, was something of a compromise, with the passage rejecting "deicide" strengthened, but with less emphasis on the condemnation of anti-Semitism. Despite last minute lobbying and a threat by persons unknown to blow up St. Peter's Basilica and the Council if it were passed, the working votes of 14-15 October approved the document by a margin of 1763 to 250. 35

Besides opposing persecution in any form, the Church recognized that "the Jews should not be presented as repudiated or cursed by God, as if such views followed from the holy scriptures." Citing St. Paul, the Council fathers insisted that the Jewish people remains most dear to God, because "he does not repent of the gifts he makes nor of the call he issues" (cf. Rom. 11: 28-29). 36

The document represented a sea change in Catholicism's official attitude toward the Jewish people. Although the final text was somewhat diluted and dealt with Judaism in a broader context, it still signaled a profound theological shift. Although not directly linked to Vatican-Israeli relations, it inevitably contributed to their development. By rejecting the notion of collective guilt for the death of Jesus, the Council removed once and for all any pretext for opposing the formation of the State of Israel on pseudo-theological grounds, while the document's tone helped to create a climate that would eventually ease diplomatic dialogue.

Still, the Vatican attempted to occupy a middle ground, recognizing rights of both Israel and the Palestinians. On the eve of the vote on Nostra Aetate, for example, Paul VI assured the Palestinian activist priest Ibrahim Ayyad that the Council would not allow the Israelis to exploit the document, and that it would not negatively affect legitimate Palestinian rights. 37 Paul VI, however, had met with Israeli president Zalman Shazar during his pilgrimage, and the assistance of the World Zionist Organization and American Jewish Committee, as well as Israeli representatives, in the drafting of Nostra Aetate insured that relations with Israel were also enhanced. 38

1967-1978: FROM WAR TO WAR

The Vatican, like most of the world, was surprised by the 1967 Six Day War. Prior to this, the Church's situation had largely stabilized, with most of the losses of 1948-49 recovered. Now, an entirely new political situation had been created. On the one hand, Israel had gained control of virtually all the Christian shrines, including those of East Jerusalem and the West Bank. The rapidity with which the Knesset passed legislation annexing East Jerusalem made it obvious that anything other than permanent Jewish hegemony was now extremely unlikely. On the other, Israel was now the de facto ruler of over half a million Palestinians. This helped to revive Arab nationalism and encouraged Palestinians to take control of their own fate.

The result was that the Vatican's diplomatic engagements on both sides became more active. On 6 October 1969, Pope Paul VI officially received Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban in a meeting that the latter viewed as very positive. 39 More mixed were the results of the 15 January 1973 meeting of Paul VI with Prime Minister Meir. While this meeting may well have enhanced relations with the State of Israel, its character and tone were difficult. While Meir raised the issues of Israel's desire for peace and its concern about terrorism, the pope pressed her on the refugee situation, as well as the question of the Holy Places and the universal character of Jerusalem.40 Following the meeting, the Vatican press office issued a statement that nothing had changed in the Holy See's attitudes toward the Holy Land or Israel, provoking an angry response in the Israeli press and the ire of the PrimeMinister, who had tried to present the meeting at home as an overwhelming success.41

A local problem that pointed to at least some movement in relations between the Holy See and Israel involved the sale of a pilgrim hostel, Notre Dame de France. The French Assumptionist Fathers who had staffed it since 1885 sold the property in 1970 to the Jewish National Fund, provoking an angry Vatican response for not having had the right of approval of the sale. For the first time, the Church hired lawyers and made a claim in an Israeli court. In a compromise settlement in 1972, the Israeli government rescinded the initial sale, and resold the property to the Vatican. 42 The fact that normal legal proceedings could occur, as well as the response by the State of Israel, indicates that contacts were at least developing.

Paul VI's growing interest was signaled by a number of events. On 1 October 1973, the University of Bethlehem opened with Vatican funding with the designated purpose of providing a Catholic tertiary institution to serve Palestinians as a "memorial" of the pope's 1964 pilgrimage. On 17 July 1974, he sent a note to Monsignor John G. Nolan, president of the Pontifical Mission for Palestine, indicating that the Palestinians were dear to him because they included followers of Christ, had been sorely tried, and were the people of the Holy Land. 43 In what amounts to the Holy See's first reference to the Palestinians as a "people" and not simply as refugees, this letter, while circulated only within Church circles, seems to amount to an attempt to rebut Prime Minister Meir's famous denial that there was a Palestinian people.

Within a few weeks, however, the Vatican found itself in a more ambiguous situation. On 18 August, the Greek Catholic patriarchal vicar in Jerusalem, Archbishop Hilarion Capucci, was arrested by Israeli security forces and charged with gun-running and complicity in the terrorist activities of an illegal organization, the PLO. Following a trial by a military court whose jurisdiction he denied, Capucci was given a twelve year jail sentence. The official Vatican response praised Capucci's previous leadership in the Melkite Church, and commented that the sentence could only increase tension "in a territory where . . . a just peace is still far away," 44 provoking an angry Israeli reaction.

Another factor complicating the situation was growing political instability in Lebanon. As early as July 1974, the Lebanese bishops made an impassioned plea to the world's bishops, asking for their intervention and insisting that only a just solution to the Palestinian question could restore national equilibrium.45 Less than a year later, however, their stance had become more confessional, insisting that they had done all that was possible for the Palestinians and, by implication, chastising them for siding with Islamic interests. 46

Attempts by militant Maronite Catholics to draw the Vatican into the conflict on the Phalangist side met with failure. Between 1975 and 1980, Vatican diplomats conducted four missions to Lebanon, though with little success. 47 Generally, the Vatican was guided by several major principles: 1) that the conflict should not impede Muslim-Christian dialogue; 2) that the behavior of radical Christians should not be allowed to compromise the formula for coexistence expressed in the 1943 National Covenant; and, 3) that Palestinian refugees should not be subjected to further injustice as a result of the war. 48 One Vatican expert has commented that some of his Israeli counterparts were unable to understand the Holy See's lack of support for the Phalangists, its co-religionists, failing to grasp the Church's greater concern for issues of justice than for tribal loyalties. 49 Once again, however, the Vatican adopted a neutral stance, concerned more about the conflict's results than its ideological roots, and carefully trying to make sure that concern for Palestinian rights did not imply approval of PLO activities in Lebanon.

The Lebanese civil war, however, further intensified Vatican concern for the region. In a rarely cited but critical 1975 Christmas message to the College of Cardinals, Pope Paul VI took the opportunity to address Israel directly:

Although we are conscious of the still very recent tragedies which led the Jewish people to search for safe protection in a state of its own, sovereign and independent, and in fact precisely because we are aware of this, we would like to ask the sons of this people to recognize the rights and legitimate aspirations of another people, which have also suffered for a long time, the Palestinian people. 50

This allocution is of key importance in that, for the first time in the Church's history, both Zionist aspirations and the State of Israel are directly recognized, and simultaneously, paralleled with comparable Palestinian goals. The papal message made explicit what had become a major direction in Vatican policy, a willingness to recognize the legitimacy of both Israeli and Palestinian quests for statehood.

While the Lebanese situation continued to vex both Israeli and Vatican diplomats, new openings for peace received the Holy See's support. By the "provisional" end of the Lebanese civil war in 1976, the Vatican had become convinced that a comprehensive peace, with special attention to the Palestinian situation, was vital to its interests. The initiative that brought Anwar Sadat to Jerusalem in 1977 was warmly supported by the Holy See, and it was reinforced in its positions on the Arab-Israeli conflict and Palestinian question by those of the American Carter administration, which exerted significant pressure to bring about a solution. 51

THE ERA OF JOHN PAUL II

The election of the Polish cardinal Karol Wojtyla to the papacy in 1978 marked a turning point in Vatican-Israeli relations. Unlike most of his twentieth century predecessors, he had not risen from the ranks of the diplomatic service. His career of leadership in a Soviet bloc country largely left him unprepared to deal with Middle-Eastern geopolitics. However, a background of substantive contact with Judaism from childhood on gave him a unique set of experiences unlike those of any other recent pontiff.

The town in which John Paul II grew up, Wadowice, had had a Jewish population of some 20 or 30 percent. After his mother's death, Karol and his father rented their apartment from a local Jewish merchant. Wojtyla studied with Jews in the local schools, and played occasionally for the local high school's Jewish soccer team. An Israeli, a former resident of Wadowice, has commented that the Wojtylas were the one Catholic family she knew who were absolutely free of anti-Semitism. 52

Intellectually, a major influence on Karol's thought was the Polish playwright and philosopher Cyprian Norwid, who admired Jews for their culture and opposed their persecution. 53 Moreover, having lived through the Nazi occupation, John Paul's awareness of the Shoah was highly personal. All of these experiences had their effect on the Church's relations with the Jewish people and with the State of Israel.

Initially, John Paul's Middle East policy was largely a continuation of that initiated by Paul VI. On 25 March 1979, he issued a declaration of support for the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, which was to be signed the next day. Soon after, on 23 April, he held a meeting with Yossef Ciechanover, Director of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The fact that he canceled a meeting with Elias Freij, the Orthodox mayor of Bethlehem, in order to do so was seen as a low point in Palestinian relations with the Vatican. 54

The first indication that the new pope was developing his own Middle East policy came in his speech to the United Nations speech on 2 October 1979. In it, he acknowledged the success of the Camp David Accords, but went on to insist that regional peace would come only with the settling of the Palestinian Question. He also argued for guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Lebanon, and giving Jerusalem special status. 55

His clearest statement on the Middle East thus far was made on 5 October 1980 in a homily at Oronto, Italy. Following the August passage by the Knesset of a law annexing Jerusalem and declaring it the de jure capital of Israel, an act that deeply disappointed the Holy See, John Paul set out his view of the facts: that the Jewish people, after the tragic experience of the Shoah, understandably had set up the State of Israel, an action that had precipitated the "painful condition" of the Palestinian people. He ended with the hope that there would be dialogue among the three great monotheistic religions, and that Jerusalem would become their "common hearth." 56

Vatican diplomatic activity, meanwhile, intensified, especially with moderate Arab states. In 1981 and 1982, the pope met with Farouk Khaddoumi, the PLO "Foreign Minister," and with Israeli Foreign Minister Shamir. Shortly after Israel's 1982 invasion of Southern Lebanon, he sent a message to Israeli president Navon asking for strict enforcement of a cease-fire and for justice for all parties. 57 This was followed by his declaration at a public audience on 29 July that the Palestinians had a right to a homeland and by his 15 September meeting with Yasser Arafat. On the Israeli front, the Holy See concluded an agreement on 5 July 1981 on the rights of the Church to guide its own pilgrimages, an important prologue to later negotiations and a continuing mainstay of the relationship. 58

John Paul II's most comprehensive statement on the Middle East, however, came with his 20 April 1984 apostolic letter Redemptionis Anno. Issued on Good Friday, it recalls the centrality of Jerusalem for Jews, Muslims, and Christians alike, and calls for a just solution to competing claims on it, "safeguarded by a special statute internationally guaranteed." Broadening his scope, he reiterates the rights of both the Jewish and Palestinian peoples to a homeland, and of the Lebanese to a stable and peaceful life. 59

The difference between the Vatican and Israeli positions was made evident during the February 1985 meeting between the pope and Prime Minister Shimon Peres, in which Peres once again reiterated the non-negotiable status of an undivided Jerusalem as Israel's capital.60

A variety of events shaped Vatican policy for the next half decade. On 26 November 1984, twenty-six Catholic and Jewish members of the U.S. Congress sent a letter to John Paul II urging the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Jewish state, an attempt at pressure that may have had an effect opposite to the one intended. 61 The following year, an additional set of guidelines on Nostra Aetate was promulgated. While these re-emphasized the commonalities that the Hebrew Scriptures provided for both Jews and Catholics, and again condemned the use of "deicide" as a justification for anti-Semitism, it excluded any divine justification for the formation of the State of Israel, which "should be envisaged not in a perspective which is in itself religious, but in their reference to the common principles of international law."62

Of significant importance, too, was the beginning of the Intifada, the Palestinian uprising, in December of 1987. World attention focused explicitly on the Palestinian Question once again, and Israel lost ground diplomatically. Earlier in the year, a visit to Israel by New York Cardinal John O'Connor, in his capacity as president of Catholic Near East Welfare Association, had incited the Holy See's unhappiness, when it found that the cardinal intended to meet Israeli officials in Jerusalem, and the unhappiness of Israeli and American Jews, when he was persuaded by the Vatican to cancel the meetings and by his pro-Palestinian statements. 63

Rising nationalism, together with the growing maturity of the Palestinian church, probably contributed to the Vatican's naming of Michel Sabbah as the first Palestinian Latin-Rite Patriarch of Jerusalem, a role heretofore held by Italians. Sabbah would become an effective advocate for the Palestinian cause in both Vatican and world Catholic circles. A second meeting between Arafat and John Paul II later that year confirmed the Holy See's indirect support for Palestinian rights.

THE MOVE TO THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT

In the early 1990s, the political ecology shifted in ways that would create new diplomatic initiatives between the Holy See and Israel. The coalition of western and Arab states created to fight the Gulf War of 1991 established new sets of relationships, while Israel's restraint in replying to Iraqi SCUD attacks warmed relations with the United States. The Gulf War also intensified the Vatican's desire to promote peace, a linkage evident in the pope's 30 April address to the interreligious Sant-Egidio Meeting. 64 The opening of the Madrid Peace Conference in October also moved the peace agenda forward, and created a political climate that allowed the Holy See to advance its diplomatic activities with Israel. This situation was acknowledged by Cardinal Sodano, the Vatican's Secretary of State, in meetings with U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and Ambassador to the Vatican Thomas Melady. 65

Israel's right-wing Likud government also furthered the process. Previously, Israel had insisted on the establishment of diplomatic relations as a precondition to substantive negotiations. Now, however, diplomatic relations would be one element in broader negotiations, part of a general increase in diplomatic activity by David Levy, the Foreign Minister. 66 Key to the process, too, was the appointment of Avi Pazner, a veteran diplomat who had been special adviser to Shamir, as ambassador to Italy in November 1991.

Before he presented his credentials to the Italian government, Pazner was invited by the Italian ambassador to the Holy See to a lunch that included Monsignor Luigi Gatti, a diplomat specializing in the Middle East. This was followed by a meeting of Pazner with Sodano and Archbishop Tauran, the Foreign Minister, early the following year. On 8 January 1992, the pope also met with O'Connor, who had completed another Middle East trip, and recommended that the Holy See move toward establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. 67 In his 11 January address to diplomats accredited to the Holy See, the pope once again spoke of his vision for regional peace, and indicated that he considered "dialogue between Jews, Christians and Muslims to be a priority." 68

Pazner, meanwhile, had let it be known that he would welcome an opportunity to present his case to the pope for the establishment of diplomatic relations. On 26 April 1992, John Paul II received Pazner and his wife in a private audience, and when it ended, the Israeli diplomat was convinced that the pope indeed intended to establish diplomatic relations. 69 On 29 July, the Holy See and the State of Israel announced the establishment of a bilateral commission as an "official structure in the beginning of a road which should lead to the normalization of relations." 70

The signing, on 13 September 1993, of the Oslo II Agreement by the new Labor government helped move negotiations forward with the Vatican. The warming of relations was also signaled by Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi Meir Lau's willingness to meet with John Paul in September. On 30 December 1993, the Fundamental Agreement between The Holy See and the State of Israel was signed.

THE FUNDAMENTAL AGREEMENT AND ITS AFTERMATH

An examination of the text of the Fundamental Agreement shows the intermingling of theological and diplomatic issues that have characterized Vatican-Israeli relations. The Preamble acknowledges "the unique nature of the relationship between the Catholic Church and the Jewish people, and of the historic process of reconciliation and growth in mutual understanding and friendship . . ." 71 In several sections, both parties affirm their commitment to freedom of religion and conscience, combating anti-Semitism and racism, and promoting peace. 72

As a member of the bilateral commission has stated, however, the document is best viewed as a concordat, an agreement between the Holy See and a state made with the purpose of guaranteeing the rights of the Church in that country. Thus, the Fundamental Agreement's major importance to the Holy See is that it assures the Church's freedom and legal security in Israel. 73 This is spelled out in items dealing with the rights of Church-sponsored educational, health care, and media organizations, as well as respect for the "status quo" of the Holy Places, for Catholic institutions, and for promotion of pilgrimages. 74 The Holy See had traded diplomatic relations for legal guarantees.

To say this, however, is not to deny the multiple levels of meaning. These are obvious in the exchange of addresses made by Pope John Paul II and the new Israeli ambassador Shmuel Hadas on 29 September 1994. The Pope begins by mentioning both the relationship between Israel and the Vatican and between Israeli authorities and Church institutions in the Holy Land. However, he continues with the familiar themes of Middle East peace, international guarantees for Jerusalem, and Catholic-Jewish dialogue. 75 In his reply, Hadas pledges Israel's commitment to respect the rights of Catholic institutions and holy places, and to cooperate in efforts to achieve peace. To a striking degree, however, the address is taken up with the Fundamental Agreement as "a new and constructive dimension in which to bring together in dialog the Catholic Church and the Jewish people." 76 Considerable attention is paid to the pope's statements on Jewish-Catholic dialogue, events such as his visit to the Rome synagogue and the sponsoring of the Holocaust Concert, and the mutual need to fight anti-Semitism.

These speeches point up the different nuances in each party's view of relations with the other. While the pope's speech stresses elements of both theological (e.g., peace and justice, interfaith relations) and diplomatic (e.g., relations between Catholic institutions and local Israeli officials) concerns, the Israeli ambassador's is more heavily weighted toward acknowledgment of the historical-theological importance of the Agreement. While theology and traditional statecraft are to be found in both, it appears that the State of Israel views the relationship with the Holy See in a more theological/religious light.

Other recent papal statements reflect similar concerns. In his 1994 address to diplomats accredited to the Holy See, John Paul described the purpose of the Agreement as "guaranteeing for the Catholic Church in that country conditions for a normal existence," adding that the new relationship would also help it "consolidate the desire for peace and justice." 77 Most recently, the 1996 diplomatic address focuses more on justice questions, welcoming a Palestinian representative to the Holy See with the hope that the year would see definitive negotiations on the status of the occupied territories, but also containing still another plea for an international solution to the "particular problem of Jerusalem." 78

CONCLUSION

The character of Vatican relations with Zionism and the Jewish State has shifted over time, but retains some enduring elements. As the Church's theological understanding of Jews and Judaism has changed, the early rationale of opposition to Zionist aspirations because of Jewish denial of Jesus's divinity virtually disappeared. The more modern emphasis on the shared tradition of the Hebrew Scriptures, and on God's continual favor toward the Jewish people has helped to motivate the strengthening of relations between that people's state and the Holy See.

At the same time, Vatican policy has also been motivated by broader concerns of justice and human rights. Concern for the plight of Palestinian Catholic refugees has gradually been replaced by wider interest in the situation and rights of the Palestinian people, as well as for the stabilization of the entire region, especially Lebanon.

Familiar themes of religious and civil rights, however, run through the entire diplomatic history. The rights of religious institutions, preservation of the Holy Places, and the status of Jerusalem have factored in Vatican statecraft since before the State of Israel's formation.

The saga of relations between the Holy See and Israel continues, with the Permanent Working Commission mandated in the Fundamental Agreement still engaged in negotiations aimed toward agreements on more specific issues, including property and fiscal considerations, as well as legal ones. 79 Doubtless, these will retain the concerns of both theology and traditional statecraft, reflecting the complexity that has always characterized relations between Roman Catholicism and the Holy See on the one side, and the Jewish people and the State of Israel on the other.

NOTES

*The author wishes to thank the Rev. David Jaeger, OFM, for his perceptive critique of this article.

1. See, for example: Livia Rokach, The Catholic Church and the Question of Palestine (London, 1987); Sergio Minerbi, The Vatican and Zionism (Oxford, 1990); George E. Irani, The Papacy and the Middle East (Notre Dame, IN, 1986).

2. An exception to this is the highly nuanced but now dated Vatican Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict by Andrej Kreutz (Westport, CT, 1990).

3. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 8.

4. See speech of Archbishop Renato R. Martino to the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, Egypt, 7 Sept. 1994, available via the World Wide Web at URL: http//www.mbnet.mb.ca/linkages/cairo/html.

5. An example of this linkage might be seen in the Vatican's attempts, frequently successful, to sway Italian elections in an anti-Communist direction.

6. See "The Impact of the Shoah on Jewish-Catholic Relations," in Cardinal Johannes Willebrands, Church and Jewish People (New York, 1992) 157-71, for a thoughtful treatment of this issue.

7. Willebrands, Church and Jewish People, 211-39, gives the relevant texts.

8. I am indebted to the Rev. David Jaeger, OFM, for pointing out this disparity. Telephone conversation with Jaeger, 25 July 1996.

9. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 31.

10. Theodor Herzl, The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl (London, 1960) v1, 353-54. A similar position is articulated in The Jewish State (London, 1967) 30.

11. Herzl, Complete Diaries, v4, 1594.

12. Ibid., 1603.

13. That this viewpoint was current is reinforced by a more detailed statement expressing similar beliefs that appeared in the Jesuit periodical Civilita Catholica of 1 May 1897.

14. Pinchas E. Lapide in Three Popes and the Jews (New York, 1967), citing correspondence of the German ambassador to the Holy See, argues that Sokolow was successful and any change in Benedict XV's attitude was the result of intense lobbying by the Latin-rite Patriarch of Jerusalem, Barlessina (pp. 69-70). More convincing is the evaluation of Kreutz, who argues that Sokolow's tendency to shape his message to the hearer caused both Gasparri and the pope to become wary of Zionist aspirations in Palestine (p. 35). Perhaps the most positive result of these encounters was to foster a relationship between Sokolow and Msgr. Eugenio Pacelli, who would later become Pope Pius XII.

15. See Acta Apostolicae Sedes (hereafter cited as AAS) XIII (18 June 1921) 281-4, for the complete text.

16. Minerbi, Vatican and Zionism, 164-72.

17. See Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 46, 48, for the population statistics.

18. Rokach, Question of Palestine, 18; Minerbi, Vatican and Zionism, 148.

19. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 59.

20. Ibid., 62.

21. See comments by Greek Catholic archbishop Hajjar in Great Britain, Colonial Office, Palestine Royal Commission: Minutes of Evidence Heard at Public Sessions (London, 1937) 357.

22. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 64-5.

23. L'Osservatore Romano, 22-23 May 1939, cited in Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 69.

24. Lapide, Three Popes, 115-225, discusses these efforts at some length.

25. A.G. Cicognani to Myron Taylor, 22 June 1943, cited in Rokach, Question of Palestine, 20.

26. AAS XL (10 May 1948), 169-72.

27. Rokach, Question of Palestine, 33-4, 36.

28. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 100.

29. See AAS XL (26 October 1948), 433-6, for the full text of the encyclical.

30. Ibid., XXXXI (25 April 1949), 161-4, for the full text. See also, Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel (New York, 1996) 433-4.

31. Perowne (Rome) to Bevin, 7 June 1949, cited in Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 103.

32. Ibid., 100.

33. Rokach, Question of Palestine, 58.

34. Xavier Rynne, Vatican Council II (New York, 1968) 528-9.

35. Ibid., 303-05; 528-31.

36. The full text of the declaration is to be found in Willebrands, Church and Jewish People, 202-06. The quotations come from n. 4, the section dealing explicitly with Judaism.

37. Robert Brenton Betts, Christians in the Arab East (Atlanta, 1978) 159.

38. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 119.

39. Abba Eban, An Autobiography (New York, 1977) 603.

40. Vatican communique published in L'Osservatore Romano, 15-16 January 1973, cited in Rokach, Question of Palestine, 105-6. For Meir's own account of the meeting, see My Life (New York, 1975), 392-94.

41. Irani, Papacy and the Middle East, 38-39; Rokach, Question of Palestine, 107.

42. Ibid., 93-5.

43. Cited in Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 138.

44. L'Osservatore Romano, 11 December 1974, cited in Rokach, Question of Palestine, 115.

45. The full text of the letter is cited in Rokach, Question of Palestine, 137-42.

46. Rokach, Question of Palestine, 143-5.

47. Irani, Papacy and the Middle East, 118-141.

48. Ibid., 102.

49. Telephone conversation with Jaeger, 25 July 1996.

50. AAS LXVIII (24 February 1976), 134.

51. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 143-4.

52. Tad Szulc, Pope John Paul II (New York, 1995) 61-71.

53. Ibid., 40-1.

54. Kreutz, Vatican Policy, 152-3.

55. Ibid., 154.

56. John Paul II, Spiritual Pilgrimage (New York, 1995) 12-13.

57. Rokach, Question of Palestine, 197.

58. Telephone conversation with Jaeger, 25 July 1996.

59. John Paul II, Spiritual Pilgrimage, 33-7.

60. Rokach, Question of Palestine, 205.

61. Irani, Papacy and the Middle East, 24-5.

62. Notes on the Correct Way To Present the Jews and Judaism in Preaching and Catechesis in the Catholic Church, no. 33. The full text is given in Willebrands, Church and Jewish People, 226-39.

63. See The Jerusalem Post, 31 January 1987.

64. John Paul II, "Address to Participants in Sant-Egidio Interreligious Meeting," in Spiritual Pilgrimage, 147-8.

65. Thomas Patrick Melady, "Vatican-Israel Link: How the U.S. Helped." Crisis, 12 (March, 1994) 9.

66. Telephone conversation with Jaeger, 25 July 1996.

67. Melady, "Vatican-Israel Link," 10.

68. John Paul II, "Address to the Diplomatic Corps Accredited to the Holy See," in Spiritual Pilgrimage, 162.

69. See Szulc, John Paul II, 449-53, for an account of the run-up to the Fundamental Agreement.

70. Cited in Melady, "Vatican-Israel Link," 10.

71. Fundamental Agreement Between the Holy See and the State of Israel (Jerusalem, 1993) 1.

72. See Fundamental Agreement, "Articles 1 and 2, 11," 1-2,4.

73. Telephone conversation with Jaeger, 25 July 1996.

74. Fundamental Agreement, "Articles 3-5," 2-3.

75. John Paul II, "Address to the First Ambassador of Israel to the Holy See" in Spiritual Pilgrimage, 191-4.

76. Shmuel Hadas, "Reply of Ambassador Hadas," in Spiritual Pilgrimage, 196.

77. John Paul II, "1994 Address to the Diplomatic Corps: Rome," in Spiritual Pilgrimage, 181-2.

78. John Paul II, "International Law's True Meaning," Origins, 25 (25 January 1996), 526-27.

79. Telephone conversation with Jaeger, 25 July 1996.

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